Informality appears to be a systemic trait of Russian society: it intrudes into all major social institutions and shapes the economy, politics, legal system and people's daily life. As a result a peculiar mismatch emerges between formal norms and laws and the actual operation of institutions. To understand what is going on in Russia and other states in the former Soviet Union knowledge of this "dual reality" is necessary; it is not enough to know just the visible institutions but also their informal functioning.
Of course, informal relations and practices are fundamental features of any functioning society. However, the Russian case is notable, because as much research shows informality largely overtakes the formal institutional setting and shapes behavior within formal roles. In this capacity, informality subverts and shifts the initially declared goals of institutions and policies, and these then instead serve the ends of certain powerful actors and policymakers. Informality can in this way act as a catalyst and a breeding ground for corruption and deviant behavior thus hampering political and economic development and institutional dynamism. 1 We examine four recent books which analyze various aspects of informality in Russia. The first book (Ledeneva, 2013) , offers a systemic view of informality in Russia which can help to understand how informality works and its role in decision making. The second publication by Favarel-Garrigues (2011) lifts the veil on how a system of informality emerged from the Soviet period through an analysis of the policing of economic crime in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. The next book (Inshakov, 2011) provides some of the strongest evidence of the distortion of institutional goals due to informal practices in Russia. The authors describe latent crime figures and show that Russian law enforcement agencies turn a blind eye to most crimes. Finally, in considering the issue of corruption the authors in Satarov (2013) show how this broadly but paradoxically functions in classic Russian-style as a fully informal yet also highly institutionalized phenomenon. This peculiar manifestation of corruption helps the reader to understand the systemic character of informality in Russia and its role as one of the major factors acting as a brake on development.
The book Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance by Ledeneva (2013) is one of a number of publications devoted to the analysis of the model of the post-soviet capitalist system in Russia which try to explain the hidden mechanisms of governance in the country (Darden, 2008; Kosals, 2007) . It provides a comprehensive picture of the role of informality in Russian society: from the provision of public goods to the distribution of wealth. Ledeneva's research is based on a wide range of empirical data, which include interviews with insiders of this "sistema", court cases and observations. The author uncovers double standards within these data and reveals the inner structure of the "sistema", explaining patterns of its informal power.
But what is the "sistema" according to Ledeneva? A system of what? Clearly, the book is about how governance operates, in particular during the reign of Vladimir Putin, at the head of Russian government for 15 years now. But Ledeneva intentionally omits any specification in regard to the term "sistema" as this enables a nice ambiguity and invites us to think of what the meaning of this term is for different parties, both outsiders and insiders. Yet, descriptively the "sistema" emerges into view through a range of informal networks that shape and maintain it. The author points out that an exact analysis of the networks sheds light on how private relationships influence governance. Regarding proximity to political and economic leaders, Ledeneva distinguishes an inner circle, core contacts, useful friends and mediated contacts, which perform different functions in supporting the "sistema". Thus, the inner circle sets the agenda and backs up the informal activities of its participants, while core contacts ensure policy implementation through creating a safety net of loyal and interested people. Less proximate groups-useful friends and mediated contacts-help to control resources and support the stability of the "sistema".
These networks simultaneously serve the system and the private interests of its participants. Such a result emerges from the specific patterns that give power to the system. First of all, loyalty and even obedience to the leader plays far more an important role than professionalism within the system, as it provides safety and impunity for most actions. But social ties that can serve here as a highly effective means for social mobility, at the same time compromise those people who utilize them for such a goal. Such people obtain levers of power, but in return they are forced to serve their patrons and forfeit freedom in decision making. Those who get resources (for example for business) through social ties also stay dependent and vulnerable, as it is impossible to completely legalize them. Such complementarity between informal deals and interests complicates the provision of public goods, but supports the stability of the system and enhances the system's control over the private corporate sector. Therefore it prevents any possible modernization of Russian governance.
A fascinating conclusion to the book concerns the functionality of the "sistema". To put it bluntly, it works, says Ledeneva. It motivates people providing incentives that they truly want. In contrast to the Soviet system, where people served an ideology, in Putin's Russia the system provides privileges and opportunities for wealth accumulation. But this effectiveness is illusory, as primarily it orients governance toward a short-term perspective at the expense of long-term goals. The system falls into a "modernization trap of informality", in other words informal ties lead to negative consequences for institutional development, such as undermining the rule of law and decreasing the security of property rights. There are important characteristics of the "sistema" then that prevent the modernization of Russia and foment conflict in the globalized international economy.
Over and above this original argument, the book does a fine job of combining previous studies of Russian informality. Its unique selling point is explaining the detailed mechanism, the incentives and opportunities embedded in the network structures, behind the "sistema", and thus the difficulties Russia faces to modernize as well as contributing to our understanding of how Russia "really works".
One element that Ledeneva chooses not to focus on is the question of the historical roots of modern Russian informality. They might largely be found in the Soviet past and the nature of the economic reforms during the collapse of the Soviet system. This conclusion follows from the book Policing Economic Crime in Russia: From Soviet Planned Economy to Privatization by Gilles Favarel-Garrigues (2011) .
This book is devoted to advancing understanding of how the nature of economic crime and forms of combating it were changing from Soviet times through the reform period of the 1980s known as perestroika and finally to the new period of "Russian capitalism". The term "economic crime" in the book is used as an umbrella term for an entire group of offenses that, in some regard, were economic in nature or against property. Such offenses, found across all chapters of the Soviet Criminal Code were frequently used for political purposes. The actual goal of going after certain forms of economic crime was never declared openly and formally but instead was governed by opaque incentives and informal mechanisms that favored particular groups in the Soviet and Russian elite.
By paying attention to the policing of economic crime in the Soviet period, FavarelGarrigues explores the roots of the informal economy in post-Soviet Russia through a historical lens. This gives the book its essential value; there is a lack of rigorous, academic empirical research which includes both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. There are a few studies about informal relations, corruption and the informal economy in the USSR (Feldbrugge, 1984; Grossman, 1977; Katsenelinboigen, 1977; Simis, 1982) and a lot of research about such topics in the post-Soviet period (see Clarke, 1995; Galligan and Kurkchiyan, 2003; Grødeland, 2007; Ledeneva, 2006; Lehmann and Muravyev, 2012; McCann, 2000; McMylor et al., 2000; Oleinik, 2004; Round et al., 2008; Wedel, 2005) . Favarel-Garrigues' analysis of the Soviet period, perestroika and the beginning of radical economic reforms, the massive privatization of the early and mid-1990s and its consequences, provided an appropriate methodological lens for a deep understanding of many current Russian complexities in the policing of the economy. The book clearly shows that the situation in Russian society in the beginning of the 1990s had consistent continuities with Soviet times. Yet, this left us with a certain question-were some of these continuities by design? As the author writes:
one of the aims of the book is to explain why changes in this domain (i.e. police and other law enforcement agencies) were restricted to partial institutional measures, and why penal policy generally adhered to the Soviet model long after the collapse of the USSR.
(p. 5) It feels at times that the book describes the situation in Russia as somehow planned out by political elites. In contrast the literature on the transition period usually underlines the chaos in the political sphere that impacted heavily on most events (Shleifer and Treisman, 2001) .
Leaving this question to one side, the narrative is based on a wide range of empirical data from 1965 to the mid-1990s. It includes analyses of speeches of leaders, field research in the Sverdlovskaya region in the Ural Mountains, media materials, regional archives of reports on economic crime, analytical articles and more. It also provides a large number of real cases of informal practices that were ingrained in society during the whole period, providing much needed historical perspective on the type of "sistema" that the work of Ledeneva is concerned about in the present day.
The book starts with an overview of a whole range of illegal activities that took place, as Gregory Grossman (1977: 26) outlined in a classic early study, in "every sector of the Soviet economy". Among these are speculation, corruption, moonlighting and accounting frauds. The Prosecutors Office, the Interior Ministry and the KGB struggled with one or another economic crime depending on its nature and gravity. Additional special forces policed these illegal activities. These included social and economic surveillance bodies such as the druzhiny (people's volunteer detachments), People's Control Committees, Party Control Committees and the Finance Ministry's Control and Revision Department. The interviews conducted by the author, as well as previous research, indicate that these additional policing forms enhanced the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies providing civilian support for the professional law enforcement agencies. However, these non-professional crime-fighters often were inexperienced in law and legal issues and professionals could easily manipulate their activities and use them for the sake of alternative goals.
In later chapters the author describes change in the political sphere, law enforcement structure, penal policy and the types of economic criminal activities many of which became public knowledge due to Gorbachev's policy of openness or glasnost in the late 1980s. New media freedom heightened fear of crime and increased the already high distrust in the police within Russian society. The government responded to this with the creation of new law enforcement institutions-anti-organized-crime departments and the tax police.
The book frequently turns to the question of the effectiveness of the police during the whole period under examination. An interesting question here is whether Russian law enforcement agencies ever had a clear mission to fight economic crime? Another question is whether they actually have been able to ever fulfill such kinds of duties. The author shows that police officers, as "street-level bureaucrats" who work within certain formal frameworks, have had to satisfy not only citizens but also orders from above, and meet new legislation and performance criteria. Frequently these goals could contradict each other. Due to the bureaucratic form of the police organization, officers were involved in a wide spectrum of informal activities including the faking of performance indicators and the extortion of confessions. They also only dealt with the easiest and most accessible offences.
The book argues that especially after perestroika, when new illegal and legal economic activities arose such as cooperatives, individual entrepreneurship and new organized criminal groups, police officers faced serious difficulties. New legislation, including a revised Criminal Code, was imperfect and contained a lot of loopholes. Policemen faced enormous difficulties in interpreting laws during the second half of the 1980s. "That old boy selling the handmade baskets-do we congratulate him for his individual labor or punish him for unearned income?" (per satirical magazine Krokodil in August 1987). Moreover, everything a police officer knew about new economic crimes was learned from laws or other legal documents, they had no specialized training:
One police officer in six has no idea how he is supposed to deal with the greater independence in accounting and financial matters granted to cooperatives and individual labor activity; 56% are unsure of their duties in these circumstances. Only one third of the officers questioned said they were capable of working effectively in the present context. Police officers' skills had been a source of concern long before the development of the cooperative sector, but the problem was considerably exacerbated by the emergence of the private economy. (pp. 234-235) This situation of ambiguity eroded the police's sense of professionalism and granted police officers higher discretionary power simultaneously. As a result, the Soviet police found themselves in conditions favorable for taking part in the informal economy.
Finally, the book contains a chapter concerning police responses to privatization of business in Russia. This is particularly well done and of special interest. The author provides a comprehensive picture of the police's response to new challenges. The police was not ready to deal with new forms of private economic activity such as the cooperatives in the late 1980s. Yet, this was just a prelude of things to come. The chapter analyzes the many ways in which the privatization of state assets occurred in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This included spontaneous privatization, the so-called "komsomol economy" (new small enterprises established by the officials of the youth communist organization), and auctions and tenders. In all this, police officers largely played the role of spectator in the emergence of Russian capitalism. This generated a feeling of frustration and alienation which further served as a background to worsening police corruption.
In summary then, in contrast to Ledeneva, Favarel-Garrigues broadens the focus of the question of informality away from Russian political and economic elites. He gives us a thorough grounding for understanding both the informal practices, including widespread corruption, of the average Russian police officer in the present day as well as a genealogy of the informal practices engaged in by economic actors from the "old boy selling the basket" to the directors of large enterprises.
Many of the practices engaged in by the officers and economic actors of FavarelGarrigues' study might be termed corruption. Russia, and other former Soviet states, has an infamous reputation for this problem. Corruption in Russia has been a hot topic for international academic research for the last couple of decades. There is a huge body of academic literature about corruption which covers both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Tsarist to Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (see, inter alia, Chwalba, 2001; Heinzen, 2009; Holmes, 2012; Satter, 2004; Wedel, 2005) . This literature argues that though a high level of corruption is far from an exclusively Russian phenomenon, Russia's peculiarity in this question is the social embeddedness and culture of corruption and how this impacts on the state machine and undermines the function of government (Shlapentokh, 2003) .
What distinguishes the work of Satarov and his colleagues from the hundreds and even thousands of publications about corruption in Russia? First of all, it utilizes a rigorous methodology and high-quality sociological datasets. The data were specially collected to study corruption in Russia over several waves of this longitudinal project and included more than 8000 respondents selected randomly in all federal districts excluding the North Caucasus.
To analyze and interpret the data on corruption the authors construct a special term: the "market of corruption". They divided corruption into two main parts, daily corruption among the general population, and business corruption among business people. They then analyzed these two various markets of corruption. They studied demand and supply for corrupt dealings, variations in the two different markets, as well as conflicting trends.
The authors mention the institutionalization of corruption several times (see, for example, pp. 468, 470, 474), however they leave a theoretical analysis of the implications of this for future research (p. 742). Therefore, what appears a promising theoretical construct-"the market of corruption"-is not fully thrashed out in the book. We believe it would be possible to develop a more appropriate understanding and investigation of this term in the context of the studies of illegal markets (Beckert and Wehinger, 2013; Bouchard and Wilkins, 2010; Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004) . In particular, the book leaves open the question of exactly what the "institutionalization of corruption" actually means for these "markets of corruption" in terms of its regulation and governance.
Such a research agenda opens up thanks to the many valuable empirical findings in this book. For example, the book tells us that the percentage of people paying bribes is actually unchanged in the period 2001-2010 and includes around half of the surveyed respondents (p. 284). The risk of engaging in daily corruption has grown slightly, but the demand for corruption (willingness to pay a bribe) has dramatically decreased. This stood at 74.7 percent of respondents in 2001 and fell to 47.3 percent in 2010 alongside the intensity of corruption (average number of bribes paid by bribe-givers per year), which has declined from 1.19 in 2001 to 0.76 in 2010. Simultaneously, the average size of a bribe measured in rubles increased three-fold, from 1,800 to 5,300 rubles; but when measured as percentage of the cost of living, the average bribe decreased, from 121 percent to 93 percent. The percentage of the market of daily corruption in GDP decreased from 0.95 percent to 0.42 percent (p. 285).
Analyzing business corruption the authors found different trends. Though the percentage of bribe-givers remained unchanged among the surveyed business people for the period 2001-2005 (81-82 percent) and the intensity of bribe-giving has shrunk from 2.2 to 1.8 times per year, the average size of a bribe has grown by 12 times and reached 3.9 million rubles in 2005. As a result the market of business corruption in Russia according to the authors' estimates rocketed from one trillion to nine trillion rubles (p. 314) or 11 percent of total Russian GDP in 2001 to 54 percent in 2005. Accordingly, they estimate the market of corruption to have grown from 34 to 318 billion dollars in current US dollars. These tremendous figures of the true market of business corruption and its unbelievably high percentage of GDP mean that the authors treat business corruption as a sector of the Russian economy (p. 321).
It should be noted though that the authors present some alternative estimations of the size of business corruption: based on firms' output they calculated the size of the market as 70 billion dollars in 2005. This is 4.5 times lower than the alternative figure of 318 billion dollars. Further still, we took Saratov's figures and calculated the size of business corruption using purchasing power parity (the commonly accepted method for crosscountry comparisons of GDP). We arrived at a figure of 138 billon dollars. Though these alternative figures are very high too, these estimations suggest debate is needed as to the most accurate measures of the market for corruption.
The authors consider why there has been such fast growth in the market for business corruption. Analyzing their data they make two interesting conclusions. First, according to the opinion of surveyed business people the economic cost of lawful behavior is much higher than that for corrupt behavior. This is because of rapid bureaucratization and extra-regulation emerging during the 2001-2005 period as a product of Putin's strong state policy and the return of the state to the economy. This trend especially strengthened after the arrest of the businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003. Second, heads of firms treat the high costs of corruption as unimportant because they accept it as a strategy for problem-solving. Only 7 percent of business people saw the costs of corruption as an issue for their business against 16 percent who saw the costs of legality as an obstacle in 2001. These figures stood at 15 percent and 25 percent respectively in 2005 (p. 530). In other words, it is perceived as costlier for ordinary businessmen to follow legal norms than to move into the market of corruption.
The authors argue that the roots of this situation lie in the political change during Putin's presidency, resulting in a sharp decline of control over bureaucracy, the elimination of political opposition and the suppression of independent media and NGOs. Of course, the general population and business people take on certain moral costs when engaging in corruption and the authors provided a detailed description. However, they argue that while those who pay bribes may suffer some moral damage, this damage is not substantial.
In conclusion, this book provides strong evidence for the systemic, widespread nature of corruption in Russia through all strata of society and business. Going beyond Ledeneva's and Favarel-Garrigues' accounts of informality in Russian social and economic life, this book also asks how Russians see a way out of corruption and the "sistema". Analyzing respondents' opinions of the causes of corruption, the authors find that more than half the general population and more than 60 percent of business people see the causes as systemic. Russians, according to these data, believe that anti-corruption policies must impact the socioeconomic conditions which generate corruption rather than simply punishing people involved in corruption.
Yet, even prosecuting crime and punishing criminal behavior is a fraught process in today's Russia as our last book shows. This study, Theoretical Fundamentals of the Analysis of Latent Crime (2011) was produced by a group of scholars affiliated with the research unit of the General Prosecutor's Office. This unit has conducted research for more than a decade since 2001 and the book contains empirical data for the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] .
Research on latent crime in post-Soviet Russia initially started in the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with international scholars at the very beginning of the 1990s. The first study presented figures that showed that the majority of crime was hidden and uninvestigated (Alvazzi del Frate and Goryainov, 1994) . Such studies were conducted on the basis of a well-grounded research methodology developed by international scholars, utilizing victimization surveys, expert polls and analyses of official statistics. However, in the 2000s the Russian Ministry of Interior became inactive in conducting such studies of latent crime.
The authors of this new book use similar methodology as in the early 1990s. This is a huge volume which is full of data, tables and figures about the level of crime. Its main value is a concrete estimation of latent crime of all kinds: violent crime; theft; hate crime; "crimes against the state" and so on. Moreover, the authors systematically estimate dynamics of latent crime of all kinds during the 2000s comparing it with registered crime. These data occupied a major part of the monograph, almost 400 pages of 840 in total.
The authors reveal that an overwhelming number of crimes are latent and only 12 percent of total crimes are registered by the police and included in the official statistics presented by the Russian Ministry of Interior. They reported that near three million crimes were registered and 23 million were latent according to their research in 2009.
Even in the case of crimes such as homicide, which should be easy to detect, there is still a very high level of latency (see Lysova and Shchitov, this issue). Moreover, one of the most significant latent crimes is corruption. According to the authors' estimation only 1.3 percent of the total number of bribes was registered in Russia at the end of the 2000s. As we discussed in reviewing Saratov's (2013) book above, widespread corruption undermines government, distorts markets and demoralizes people: in Russia there has been no improvement in tackling this phenomenon.
Explaining this abnormally high level of crime the authors test many factors such as the low living standards of the population, the high level of inequality, the rise of unemployment, negative trends in migration, alcoholism and anomie. However, they do not focus on the distortion of the political system or the low level of democratic pressure on the criminal justice system to investigate the size of unregistered crime itself. Such political factors can potentially improve the quality of criminal justice agencies, promote the necessary reforms to protect social order and at least decrease the level of latency of crime. In other words, in contrast to our other publications, the authors underestimate the systemic elements that produce such a high latent crime level.
We argue that two concepts might have high explanatory power to improve understanding of this phenomenon: competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010) and the notion of the predatory state (Duvanova, 2013; Moselle and Polak, 2001) , and in particular the sub-category within this of "predatory police" (see Light et al., this issue; Gerber and Mendelson, 2008) . Competitive authoritarian regimes, ones that maintain a façade of democracy, care about their image and push agents to generate a picture of constantly decreasing crime. Meanwhile a system of predatory policing creates material incentives for police officers to refuse to register crimes and to "fake performance" (Paneyakh, 2014) in return for rents (bribes). The informal activities of police officers actually replace the overriding organizational goal of the police. The criminal justice system serves the interests of an image-obsessed state, which in turn buys compliance from the police through allowing bribe-taking. In this systemic informal arrangement, public security suffers. Informality itself then is a big part of understanding why so few crimes go unregistered.
In conclusion, then, these publications provide a deep and wide understanding of the issue of informality in Russia. Informality impacts everything from the level of unreported and unregistered crime, to everyday business transactions or dealings with the police, to the very workings of the political system at an elite level. In some cases, this informality blurs with corruption and straightforward criminal behavior. The recent studies reviewed here show just how big this problem remains in Russia.
The four publications reviewed here all show how informality is embedded in current Russian society. This widespread phenomenon is not just some simple divergence from an ideal type "western" model. It is a "sistema" widely accepted by the Russian public and perceived as normal practice. This brings us to normative questions about modern Russian society. This society is not "transitional" any more. It has developed an equilibrium that includes a range of informal practices, understandings and norms (see Kupatadze, this issue). However, at the same time this equilibrium is not sustainable and is susceptible to manipulation by well-organized, powerful groups. We feel that where scholars now lack knowledge is precisely about such groups. We need to disaggregate Russian society and understand the various social and economic groups that exist and the variation in their values, attitudes and relations with law enforcement agencies and government. It is a challenging task to fill this gap but it would help us understand where the sources of change might emerge.
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